1.
The application of the equitable doctrines to the area of fiduciary duties is difficult, and some of the text books and even judgments serve to confuse the matter rather than clarify. This paper attempts to set out the essential aspects of the law affecting fiduciaries in a clear manner. The paper attempts to put particular focus on aspects of this area of equity that often arise for consideration in an insurance context, such as the test for the imposition of a fiduciary duty outside of the traditionally recognised categories, an analysis of causation and remedies.
Who owes fiduciary duties

2.
A fiduciary relationship exists whenever there is a relationship of confidence such that equity imposes duties or disabilities upon the person in whom the confidence is reposed in order to prevent the possible abuse of confidence (Farrington v Rowe McBride & Partners [1985] 1 NZLR 83 at 94 per
McMullin J for the New Zealand Court of Appeal). A fiduciary undertakes or agrees to act for or on behalf of, or in the interests of, another person in the exercise of a power or discretion which will affect the interests of that other person in a legal or practical sense (Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corp (1984) 156 CLR 41; (1984) 55 ALR 417).
3.
It has often been said that the categories of fiduciary relationship are not closed.
A person may become the fiduciary of another including by agreeing to be in a particular relationship with them and by agreeing to do certain things for their benefit. Such relationships will possess the "critical feature" spoken of by 9.
Where committee members of an unincorporated association are entrusted with funds received for the organisation's members, they will owe a fiduciary duty to the persons whom they represent in the disposal of those funds: Harrison v
Hearn [1972] 1 NSWLR 428. In Taylor v National Union of Mineworkers (Derbyshire Area) [1985] BCLC 237 at 241, Vinelott J held that officers of a trade union owed it a fiduciary duty, which included a duty not to misappropriate funds. (1991) 4 ACSR 527, Owen J held that although a building society was not regulated by the companies legislation then in force, its directors were in a similar position to directors of a company and had a fiduciary duty to act in the interests of the corporate body as a whole (at 531). Centre v Ty (1996) 39 AILR 5-058, employees other than senior executives and officers may owe the business a fiduciary duty, depending on the circumstances. The more senior the employee, the more likely that the obligations will be fiduciary in character. Employees of relative seniority within an organisation (such as employees with managerial responsibilities) will owe fiduciary duties to their employer: Concut Pty Ltd v Worrell (2000) 75 ALJR 312 at [17] . The existence of the fiduciary duty owed as employee can arise from circumstances. The manager of the property developer in Consul Developments v DPC Estates Ltd (1975) 132 CLR 373 at 394 -395, although irregularly appointed, assumed the position of director and on behalf of the company performed the task of finding, investigating and reporting upon properties suitable for purchase by the company. In that case the manager was in breach of his fiduciary duty by exploiting a business opportunity that was suitable for his employer. In Singtel Optus v Almad [2013] NSWSC 1427, a middle management employee who was many down the corporate ladder from the board was held to owe a fiduciary duty.
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16. However, the authorities do not speak with one voice on the scope of the duty.
In Digital Pulse Pty Limited v Harris [2002] NSWSC 33; (2002) 40 ACSR 487, in an aspect of his judgment not disturbed on appeal, Palmer J referred to a general duty of an employee to act in the interests of the employer and with good faith and fidelity (at [20] ). After referring to the scope of the duty that effectively embraced the conflict rule and the profit rule, his Honour said at [23] :
"When the employment ceases, the employee is free to compete with the employer unless subject to a valid contractual restraint on competition. The employee may take away and use the benefit of personal relationships built up with particular customers of the former employer and may solicit any customer who the employee can recall without the aid of a list taken from the former employer and without deliberate memorization of a customer list. The employee may not, however, use for his own benefit confidential information of the former employer, whether to solicit business from the former employer's customers or to carry out work for such customers even if unsolicited.
17. It appears that all that is necessary to avoid a breach of the double employment rule is some form of consent. Arguably, it need not be "fully informed" The stringent rule that the fiduciary cannot profit from his trust is said to have two purposes: (1) that the fiduciary must account for what has been acquired at the expense of the trust, and (2) to ensure that fiduciaries generally conduct themselves "at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd". The objectives which the rule seeks to achieve are to preclude the fiduciary from being swayed by considerations of personal interest and from accordingly misusing the fiduciary position for personal advantage. If a director has a positive duty (even if non-fiduciary) to pursue or acquire a particular benefit (which includes an opportunity) or property for the company and seeks that property for his private purposes, there will be a conflict of interest and interest. That is, the existence of a positive duty has the consequence that the company will have a relevant interest in the particular benefit or property for the purpose of the conflict rule. This does not involve the enforcement of a prescriptive fiduciary duty. This analysis may provide an answer to the conundrum about whether the "duty" with which a fiduciary's interest must not conflict is confined to fiduciary duties and if so, what duties are encompassed within that rubric. The conflict rule also prohibits a conflict of duty and duty. (1978) … must be applied with common sense and with an appreciation of the sort of circumstances in which over the last 200 years and more it has been applied and thrived. It must be applied realistically to a state of affairs which discloses a real conflict of duty and interest and not to some theoretical or rhetorical conflict. … one cannot but be conscious of the danger that the over-enthusiastic and unnecessary statement of broad general principles of equity in terms of inflexibility may destroy the vigour which it is intended to promote in that it will exclude the ordinary interplay of the doctrines of equity and the adjustment of general principles to particular facts and changing circumstances and convert equity into an instrument of hardship and injustice in individual cases … There is "no better mode of undermining the sound doctrines of equity than to make unreasonable and inequitable applications of them": per Lord Selborne LC, Barnes v Addy. 36. The focus of the fiduciary duty is on opportunities that the party to whom the duty was owed should have had the chance to exploit. Of course, the scope of the rules can be narrowed or excluded by contract or other instrument which defines the duties and powers of the fiduciary. There is no suggestion in this case of any relevant provisions in WAE's constitution. However, that is not the only means by which the content of fiduciary duties can be affected. The High Court has said that the content of fiduciary duties are moulded to the character of the particular relationship so that even within an established fiduciary relationship, the content of the duties will not be uniform for all cases: United Dominions Corp Ltd v Brian Pty Ltd (1985) 157 CLR 1 at 11; 60 ALR 741 at 747. Further, the subject matter over which fiduciary obligations extend can be ascertained from the course of dealing between the parties or the circumstances of the appointment of the fiduciary: But the mere existence of a fiduciary relationship does not define the nature of the duties that arise for three reasons. First, it is wrong to assume that the duty owed by a fiduciary attaches to every aspect of the fiduciary's conduct, however, irrelevant that conduct is to the relationship that is the source of the duty: Re Coomber [1911] 
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39. The scope of business activities that a fiduciary is forbidden from conducting is defined by the business activities of the person to whom the duty is owed (called the "principal business" in this paper). The fiduciary cannot do anything that is within the scope of the principal business, or which might be in competition with it. As Dixon J put it in Birtchnell v Equity Trustees Executors & Agency Co Ltd (1929) 42 CLR 384 at 408:
The subject matter over which the fiduciary obligations extend is determined by the character of the venture or undertaking for which the partnership exists, and this is to be ascertained, not merely from the express agreement of the parties, whether embodied in written instruments or not, but also from the course of dealing actually pursued by the firm. [T]he partnership was entitled to avail itself of any opportunity to embark upon such a transaction which came to the knowledge of the partners or any of them, and knowledge and information acquired by a partner as to the readiness of a client to share such profits, as to the conditions upon which he would do so, and generally as to every fact bearing upon the terms which the partnership might negotiate with him were all matters which no partner could lawfully withhold from the firm and turn to his own account. The relation between such a client and the partnership is a matter affecting the joint interests which each member was bound to safeguard and protect, and no member could enter into dealings or engagements which conflicted or might conflict with those interests or which gave him a "bias against the fair discharge of his duty" in that respect.
43. Isaacs J explained the wider notion of the course of dealing in this way (at 394):
If, for instance, A and B are in partnership as wholesale grocers, and B arranges with C, a retail grocer, to share C's profits if B influences A to agree to supply C, I take it as clear that B's arrangement with C is a "transaction concerning the partnership," though C's business itself is wholly outside its scope. The proposition that the subject matter over which fiduciary obligations extend is to be determined from the course of dealing between the parties was also recognised in (1) Every partner must account to the firm for any benefit derived by the partner without the consent of the other partners from any transaction concerning the partnership, or for any use by the partner of the partnership property, name, or business connexion.
(2) This section applies also to transactions undertaken after a partnership has been dissolved by the death of a partner, and before the affairs thereof have been completely wound up, either by any surviving partner or by the representatives of the deceased partner.
(3) This section does not apply to or in respect of an incorporated limited partnership. Breach of fiduciary duty is not to be equated with common law deceit. It simply gives rise to a personal equity which is to be recognised by a court having Chancery jurisdiction so as to lead to a grant of an equitable remedy. It does not itself give rise to a right to damages. It relates to the transaction between the fiduciary and the person to whom he owes the duty. The remedy is essentially restitutionary in its character. The fiduciary may be restrained from enforcing the transaction. It may be rescinded. Accounts and restitution may be ordered. But, if a plaintiff seeks to recover common law damages, he must discharge the same burden of proof as would be required by a court applying the common law. Moreover, in considering such a matter it is important to remember that, in the language of James LJ, 'the general principle that … no agent in the course of his agency, in the matter of his agency, can be allowed to make any profit without the knowledge and consent of his principal … is an inflexible rule, and must be applied inexorably by the Court, which is not entitled … to receive evidence, or suggestion, or argument as to whether the principal did or did not suffer any injury in fact by reason of the dealing of the agent; for the safety of mankind requires that no agent shall be able to put his principal to the danger of such an inquiry as that' (Parker v McKenna). Further, and this, perhaps, is a necessary corollary, the partner is responsible to his firm for profits, although his firm could not itself have gained them. See Costa Rica Railway Co v Forwood, where Vaughan Williams LJ formulates the principles and concludes: 'As I understand, the rule is a rule to protect directors, trustees, and others against the fallibility of human nature by providing that, if they do choose to enter into contracts in cases in which they have or may have a conflicting interest, the law will denude them of all profits they may make thereby, and will do so notwithstanding the fact that there may not seem to be any reason of fairness why the profits should go into the pockets of their cestuis que trust, and although the profits may be such that their cestuis que trust could not have earned them at all.
53. However, traditional equitable constraints, such as the need to do equity, and the idea that equity is not to be used to produce a windfall gain or inequitable benefit. These concepts may be reflected in the terms on which the account is taken (such as just allowances). 
hen the law requires the proof of any fact, the tribunal must feel an actual persuasion of its occurrence or existence before it can be found. It cannot be found as a result of mere mechanical comparison of probabilities independently of any belief in its reality … it is enough that the affirmative of an allegation is made out to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. But reasonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or established independently of the nature and consequence of the fact or facts to be proved.
The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent likelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding, are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. In such matters "reasonable satisfaction" should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences. [C]onsent is only a prima facie defence and that the Court must consider in detail "all the circumstances" in order to determine whether it would be "fair and equitable" for that beneficiary to be permitted to complain of that breach. [1962] 1 WLR 86 at 108, Wilberforce J observed, in an oft-cited passage, that:
(2) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether it is so satisfied, it is to take into account: (a) the nature of the cause of action or defence; and (b) the nature of the subject-matter of the proceeding; and (c) the gravity of the matters alleged.
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The result of these authorities appears to me to be that the court has to consider all the circumstances in which the concurrence of the cestui que trust was given with a view to seeing whether it is fair and equitable that, having given his concurrence, he should afterwards turn round and sue the trustees: that, subject to this, it is not necessary that he should know that what he is concurring in is a breach of trust, provided that he fully understands what he is concurring in ... the general principle of law, namely, that if a general meeting is called to approve an action or proposed action of the directors it will not be effective unless there is a disclosure of material facts to enable shareholders to make a properly informed decision and an absence of material misrepresentation or material concealment.
As Black J noted in Barescape Pty Ltd v Bacchus Holdings (No. 9):
Informed consent generally requires that a fiduciary disclose to the beneficiary all information in his or her possession in relation to the proposed transaction which was relevant to the beneficiary's consideration of whether or not to consent to it, and at least the material facts: expressed the principle in this way:
[w]hat is required for a fully informed consent is a question of fact in all the circumstances of each case and there is no precise formula which will determine in all cases if fully informed consent has been given. CLR 89 at [107] , the majority of the High Court also noted that disclosure sufficient to establish informed consent could be made "at different times and in different ways" and that "the sufficiency of disclosure can depend on the sophistication and intelligence of the persons to whom disclosure must be made." Their Honours emphasised that, in that case, the principals of Say-Dee had much business experience and intelligence and were shrewd and astute, and pointed to the glaring improbability that they would not readily have deduced relevant matters from their own experience and the information which had been provided to them. However, the task of explanation inherent in a request to be There is no doubt that the disclosure required to avoid the consequences of a conflict is a full and frank disclosure of all material facts. The identification of the precise information which must be disclosed so that the fiduciary's principal is kept "fully informed of the real state of things" (Gray v New Augarita Porcupine Mines Ltd [1952] 3 DLR 1 at 14 per Lord Radcliffe) is likely to depend on the particular facts of the case before the court. It seems to me that the material facts in this case are the facts which give rise to the conflict ...
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Similarly, ratification of a fiduciary's breach of duty after the fact cannot occur without full disclosure of the facts: Winthrop Investments Ltd v Winns Ltd
[1975] 2 NSWLR 666.
Limitations
Application of limitation of actions concepts to fiduciary breach is complicated
by two matters. The first is that equity has traditionally declined to grant relief where the facts of the case warrant doing so under the overlapping doctrines of delay, laches and acquiescence. The second is that the Court may (and perhaps should) apply equivalent limitations provisions by analogy in some circumstances. When the circumstances of a case are such as to make it against conscience to apply the rule founded upon this analogy, the court will not enforce it. Clearly, the court must first determine whether the similarity is such as to justify the application of the analogy. Having done so, it must then consider whether, in all the circumstances, it is just to do so.
Laches and Acquiescence
According to Perry J in
This inherently discretionary analysis (combined with the principle in Wardley
Australia Ltd v Western Australia (1992) Where a Court of equity finds that a legal right, for which it is asked to give a better remedy than is given at law, is barred by an Act of Parliament, it has no more power to remove or lower that bar than has a Court of law. But where equity has created a new right founded on its own doctrines exclusively, and no Act bars that specific right, then equity is free.
84. Breach of fiduciary duty is in the exclusive jurisdiction of equity. (2013) 92 ACSR 554. His Honour reconciled the two views, stating that in the exclusive jurisdiction of equity a court will undertake an assessment of an analogue legal claim. His Honour set out the test:
Brereton J considered this issue in Re Auzhair Supplies Pty Ltd (in Liq)
[62] First, in equity's auxiliary jurisdiction, where the court is asked to give a superior remedy for a legal right, equity applies the legal limitation period: it obeys the law.
[63] Second, even in equity's exclusive jurisdiction, where the cause of action is equity's own creature, then if there is an analogue between the equitable claim and a legal or statutory right to which a limitation period applies, a court of equity will ordinarily apply the limitation period: in this, equity follows the law, and applies the limitation period as an aspect of the doctrine of laches. The existence of an analogue can only be determined by considering each of the equitable claim, the legal or statutory right and their respective remedies in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case; but it does not depend on a minute comparison between the claim in equity and the supposed analogue; while differences in the elements of the respective causes of action are relevant, and possibly significant, not every difference justifies not applying the statute by analogy. Further, because, in this context, application of the analogous limitation period is an aspect of laches, it is also subject to exceptions where the greater equity outweighs it; thus it is relevant to consider the plaintiff's knowledge of the plaintiff's rights and in particular of the impact of fraud, as equity will not apply a time limit in a case of "concealed fraud". The relevant inquiry is therefore to consider, first, whether the equitable claim and the corresponding legal right are so similar that the time limit applicable to the latter should be applied to the former; and, second, where such a similarity exists, whether it would nevertheless be inequitable to apply the analogous limitation period. I agree that the application of a time limit by analogy cannot depend on a minute comparison between the claim in equity and the claim that is said to be similar and is said to be statute barred. It is to be expected that there will always be differences in the elements of the claim in equity and the claim which is said to be statute barred. However, differences in the elements of the respective causes of action must be relevant, and possibly significant.
87. Other cases, however, reveal an inconsistent approach and a tendency to let the merits of the case drive the application of principle. (1994) That responsibility may no doubt be extended in equity to others who are not properly trustees, if they are found either making themselves trustees de son tort, or actually participating in any fraudulent conduct of the trustee to the injury of the cestui que trust. But, on the other hand, strangers are not to be made constructive trustees merely because they act as the agents of trustees in transactions within their legal powers, transactions, perhaps of which a Court of Equity may disapprove, unless those agents receive had become chargeable with some part of the trust property, or unless they assist with knowledge in a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the trustees. Offers 101. Careful attention to the remedies sought needs to be paid whenever offers of compromise or Calderbank offers are being drafted. Where a party succeeds in a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, it would be rare that equitable compensation will be the only remedy. This means that where there is a claim for an injunction, constructive trust, declaration or remedy in tracing, a reasonable attempt should be made to determine the likely relief that will be granted by the Court. Where the relief offered in the Calderbank letter mirrors the relief actually granted by the Court, or is in terms more favourable to the plaintiff, the defendant will be more likely to obtain Calderbank protection.
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Conversely, where a plaintiff is seeking to use an offer of compromise or a Calderbank letter, care should be taken not to include too much relief in the form of constructive trust remedies and tracing orders. These remedies are difficult to make out at trial and are discretionary. If the purpose of the offer is
